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Abstract
The present paper provides an analysis of Euler’s solution to the
Königsberg bridges problem. Euler proposes three different solutions to
the problem, addressing their strengths and weaknesses along the way. I
put the analysis of Euler’s paper to work in the philosophical discussion
on mathematical explanations. I propose that the key ingredient to a
good explanation is the degree to which it provides relevant information.
Providing relevant information is based on knowledge of the structure in
question, graphs in the present case. I also propose computational com-
plexity and logical strength as measures of relevant information.
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1 Introduction
What is a good mathematical explanation? While there is no generally agreed-
upon answer to this question, some particular examples of good mathemati-
cal explanations have emerged from the recent philosophical discussion. Leon-
hard Euler’s solution to the Königsberg bridges problem is such an example.
Philosophers have discussed the Königsberg case for some time; see, e.g., Penco
(1994); Franklin (1994); Wilholt (2004); Pincock (2007, 2012); Baker (2012);
Lyon (2012); Lange (2013); Pincock (2015). In particular, Euler’s Theorem
provides a good explanation of why there is no path in Königsberg that crosses
every bridge exactly once. However, philosophers disagree about what kind of
explanation it is, and about the contribution of mathematics to the explanation.
The present paper provides a new proposal of why Euler’s explanation is
good. The proposal is based on a close analysis of Euler’s original solution
to the problem.1 In his paper, Euler proposes three different solutions to the
Königsberg problem. Along the way, Euler addresses the respective strengths
and weaknesses of these three solutions. I then put the analysis of Euler’s paper
to work in the philosophical discussion on mathematical explanations, and I
propose that the key ingredient to a good explanation is the degree to which
an explanation provides relevant information. Providing relevant information
is based on the use of knowledge of the particular structure in question, graph
theory in the present case. I also propose computational complexity and logical
strength as measures of relevant information.
2 Euler’s Königsberg
Euler’s paper is entitled “Solutio problematis ad geometriam situs pertinentis”
(“The solution of a problem relating to the geometry of position”).2 In the
beginning of the paper, Euler states why he is interested in this problem: It is
an example of a new, special kind of geometry, which does not involve quantities
and measures – it is a “geometry of position”, which was previously introduced
by Leibniz. This area of mathematics is now called topology.
In paragraph 2, Euler distinguishes two problems. He illustrates the situation
in Königsberg using a schematic map, reproduced as figure 1. He assigns capital
letters A,B,C,D to the areas, and lower case letters a, b, c, ... to the bridges
connecting areas. The first problem is to find out whether it is possible to find
a path that crosses every bridge of this system exactly once – I will call this the
Königsberg Problem. Euler notes that there is no definite answer to this problem
1See Molinini (2012) for a successful example of analyzing Euler’s work in the context of
mathematical explanations.
2I use the widely available translation Euler (1956). See Hopkins and Wilson (2004) for a
useful overview of Euler’s paper. I thank an anonymous referee for his suggestion to consider
Euler’s paper.
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as yet. He then generalizes the problem, and asks how one can determine the
solution, not only for this particular configuration, but for any kind of system,
i.e., any kind of branching of the river and any number of bridges – I will call
this the General Problem. This paragraph is particularly noteworthy because
Euler introduces two kinds of letters, one for places, or areas, the other for
connections, or bridges. This distinction is key to a graph-theoretic approach
to both problems, as we will see in a moment.
Figure 1: Euler’s Map of Königsberg
In paragraph 3, we learn of a first method for solving the Königsberg Prob-
lem: it consists of “tabulating all possible paths” and examining whether one of
them uses every bridge exactly once – I will call this the Brute Force Method.3
Euler rejects this method because it is “too tedious and too difficult”: there
are too many possible paths, and for bigger systems, this method becomes in-
tractable. The approach generates “details that are irrelevant to the problem”.
I will return to these suggestive remarks about intractability and irrelevant in-
formation below.
The most important innovation of the paper, Euler’s graph-theoretical ap-
proach, is introduced in paragraph 4. It consists of the use of a particular
notation for paths in the bridge system in terms of the crossing of bridges: The
crossing of any one of the bridges a and b between A and B can be written
as AB. A path from A over B to D is noted as ABD, using any one of the
bridges connecting these areas. This notational shift is characteristic of the
graph-theoretic nature of Euler’s approach to both problems, and marks the
beginning of graph theory. In modern graph theory, a multigraph is represented
by a set of vertices V , and a multiset of edges E, represented by pairs of ver-
tices.4 This is exactly what Euler’s notation achieves: Two structurally related
3Euler does not specify how to carry out the Brute Force Method in detail. One way of
implementing it is to write down all (finitely many) paths of length seven starting from one
of the areas A,B,C,D, and see whether any one of these paths includes just seven different
bridges.
4A multigraph is a graph where two vertices can be connected by more than one edge.
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kinds of objects – bridges and areas in the present case – are brought into cor-
respondence by notating edges (here: bridges) as pairs of vertices (here: areas).
There are no longer two separate sets of labels for the two kinds of objects,
but one is expressed in terms of the other.5 The bulk of the paper consists of
putting this simple yet powerful idea to work, as Euler notes.
Euler proceeds to derive what I call the Intermediate Method. First, he notes
that we can represent an Euler path in a bridge system consisting of n bridges
by a string of n+ 1 capital letters (areas). Any path between areas A and B is
written AB. We know that if we want to use every bridge exactly once, i.e., find
an Euler path in the Königsberg system, the corresponding string has to consist
of 8 letters. Next, he determines how many times a particular capital letter
(area) has to occur in such a string. Denote the number of bridges connected
to an area X, its degree, by d(X).6 If d(P ), i.e., the degree of area P , is odd,
then P will have to occur d(p)+12 times in the string: If three bridges lead to
area P , then the letter P will feature twice in the string, whether we start in P
or not, and so on. We can now apply this result to the Königsberg system. The
letter A has to occur three times, and B,C,D two times. These numbers add
up to 9, which is bigger than 8, the length of an Euler path. This shows that
it is impossible to find a path that crosses every bridge in Königsberg exactly
once. Euler then extends this method to systems with even areas. If the degree
of an area is even, there are two possibilities. If area Q is the starting point of
the trip and d(Q) is even, then the letter Q will occur d(Q)2 +1 times. If area R
is not the starting point and d(R) is even, the letter R will occur d(R)2 times.
Putting together the results for odd and even areas yields the Intermediate
Method in the following way. Recall that n designates the total number of
bridges in the system. The length of a string representing an Euler path in this
system therefore must be of length n+ 1. I will use the letter P for areas with
odd d(P ), the letter Q for an area with even d(Q), when starting in Q, and R
for areas with even d(R), when not starting in R. We can now sum up how
many letters each area contributes to a string that uses every bridge once, and
compare the result with the condition for an Euler path:∑
P
d(P ) + 1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
odd areas
+
∑
R
d(R)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
even nonstart areas
+
d(Q)
2
+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
even start area
= n+ 1 (1)
On the left-hand-side (LHS), we sum up how many letters each area con-
tributes to a complete string, depending on whether the degree of the areas is
Consequently, the multiset of edges may contain a pair of vertices more than one time.
5Arguably, the fact that Euler’s paper stands at the beginnings of graph theory is its most
important innovation. This supports an observation by Yehuda Rav (1999) that one of the
most important roles of proving theorems lies in the novel insights generated by proof methods
beyond determining the truth of particular theorems.
6Euler does not employ the notation d(X) for the degree of X; his argument hardly uses
any algebraic expressions. The reconstruction given here follows Euler closely, but transforms
some of his reasoning into algebra in order to make it more accessible.
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odd, even, and whether we start in an area with even or odd degree. If an Euler
path exists, this sum has to be equal to n+1. This is the Intermediate Method.
It tells us that no Euler path exists if equality is violated. The equation also
shows that if there are odd areas, we should start there in order to make the
sum on the LHS smaller. If we do so, the contribution of 1 to the even start
area drops out.
Once we have established this relationship, we can easily deduce a further
theorem, as Euler notes – what is now called Euler’s Theorem. Note, first, that
the number of areas with odd degree has to be even. The sum of the degrees of
all areas counts every bridge twice, and therefore has to yield an even number,
2n. If we multiply equation (1) by 2, we can replace the resulting 2n on the
right-hand-side (RHS) by the sum of the degrees of all areas:
∑
P
(d(P ) + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
odd areas
+
∑
R
d(R)︸ ︷︷ ︸
even nonstart areas
+ d(Q) + 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
even start area
=
∑
X
d(X) + 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
all areas
(2)
From equation (2), we can deduce that equality only holds in two cases.
First, if there are no odd areas at all, the first summand on the LHS drops out,
and equality follows. Second, if there are two odd areas, we have to start in one
of them, because otherwise, both the first and the third summand contribute 2
to the LHS, exceeding the RHS by 2. If there are four, six, etc. odd areas, the
equality is violated because the first summand contributes at least an additional
4, which exceeds the RHS by at least 2. This is Euler’s Theorem. It gives two
conditions that are jointly necessary for the existence of an Euler path: it exists
only if a) the degree of all areas is even, or if b) the degree of exactly two areas
is odd, and we start the journey in one of these areas. Euler’s Theorem yields
a method for determining whether or not an Euler path exists.7
3 Preliminaries
Before I proceed to analyze Euler’s work from an explanatory perspective, some
preliminary remarks are in order. One important distinction in the debate on
mathematical explanations is between mathematical explanations of mathemat-
ical facts, so-called “Intra-Mathematical Explanations” (IME), and explanations
of empirical phenomena that make use of mathematics, so-called “Scientific Ex-
planations using Mathematics” (SEM).8 In principle, the three methods can be
7Euler’s Theorem is different from modern formulations of the theorem in several respects;
see, e.g., Diestel (2006, pp. 21) for a modern account. First, Euler asks if it is possible to cross
every bridge in Königsberg exactly once, without the assumption that the Euler path should
be closed. Second, Euler does not assume that graphs are connected. This is a necessary
assumption for the theorem. Third, Euler only proved one direction of the modern version of
the theorem, viz. the statement that a closed Euler path exists if, and only if, every area has
even number of edges. He did not prove that if a closed Euler path exists, every vertex has
an even number of edges; this was only proved 135 years later; see Wilson (1986, p. 270).
8The labels IME and SEM are due to Baker (2012); see Mancosu (2011) for a useful
overview of the debate on explanations in pure and applied mathematics.
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analyzed as belonging to both IME and SEM: The methods can be used to give
explanations that concern certain kinds of graphs, and they can also be used to
give explanations that concern real bridge systems, e.g., the historical system in
Königsberg. There is much to be said about the two kinds of explanations and
how they are related. However, in the present paper, I will analyze the three
methods as intra-mathematical explanations of mathematical facts. Euler’s pa-
per, the three methods, and the differences between the methods are all purely
mathematical. Therefore, the main differences between the three methods are
also intra-mathematical. This is not to say that these differences are irrelevant
when we apply the methods in the explanation of empirical phenomena, but we
can understand the explanatory virtues of the methods without taking empirical
phenomena into account.
What are the relata of the explanations we will consider? In the rest of the
paper, I will be somewhat loose when writing about the explanans of interest.
I will write that a “ method explains”. This should be read as shorthand for: a
method is part of an explanation, or is used in giving an explanation. By this
I mean that, if we want to, say, explain why there is no Euler path in a certain
graph, we do not draw exclusively on the methods; the structure of the graph
in question is also part of the explanans.9
Turning to the explanandum, it is important to keep in mind that the meth-
ods operate at different levels. We can ask why an Euler path does or does
not exist in a particular graph, such as the Königsberg graph. This would be a
single-case explanandum. We can also ask why there is an Euler path in some
graphs, and not in others. The explanation is also provided by the methods, but
the explanandum encompasses a whole family of graphs. Finally, we can ask for
an explanation of the validity of the methods or theorems themselves. In this
case, the answer will consist in a proof that establishes the method’s validity.
The main focus of the present paper is on the second kind of explanandum. The
first reason for this choice is that, historically, the General Problem is the focus
of Euler’s paper. The second, systematic reason is that if we want to understand
the explanatory power of the methods, we have to understand how they work
in general. Of course, once we understand their general features, we also gain a
better understanding of how they work in particular cases.
Finally, a remark on the term “method”. So far, I have adopted Euler’s
terminology and discussed “methods”. In modern terms, we can think of the
methods as algorithms, and viewing them as algorithms is of some importance,
as we will see below. The terms “method” and “algorithm” can be used inter-
changeably. Admittedly, it is somewhat unusual to analyze the explanatory
merits of algorithms, because the debate on mathematical explanations focuses
on the explanatory methods of proofs. However, the discussion of algorithms
can be rephrased in terms of proof, in the following manner: The algorithms
deductively establish whether or not some graphs have certain properties. In
this sense, they are (parts of) proofs.
9To use an imperfect analogy with the deductive-nomological model of explanation, we
need both a general law as well as initial conditions to deduce the explanandum.
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4 Are the Methods Explanatory?
The goal of the present paper is to determine just what it is about Euler’s
three methods that makes them more or less explanatory. However, why should
we think that the three methods are in fact more or less explanatory in the
first place? This issue is particularly pressing because Euler’s discussion is not
framed in explanatory terms. I will argue below that some of Euler’s remarks are
fruitful for our understanding of mathematical explanations, but the analysis of
the three methods’ explanatory virtues should not be based on Euler’s remarks
exclusively.
There are good reasons for believing that the three methods are, in fact,
more or less explanatory. First, there is a consensus in the philosophical and
mathematical literature that Euler’s Theorem is a good explanation why there
is no Euler path in Königsberg; see the references given in section 1 above. The
point of contention in the philosophical debate is not whether this is a good
explanation or not, but the reason why it is good. I will simply follow the
consensus view and presuppose that Euler’s Theorem is a good explanation.
Second, Brute Force Methods are considered to have low explanatory power
in general.10 Brute Force Methods have been called “trivial” by mathemati-
cians; see, e.g., Gowers (2008, p. 580), and they have been characterized as
not explanatory by philosophers. According to Mark Colyvan (2012), one of
the reasons why proving a theorem by Brute Force is not explanatory is that “it
looks as though the theorem itself holds merely by accident” (Ibid., p. 81). If we
inspect the Brute Force Method in the Königsberg case, we find that Colyvan’s
observation is confirmed: The application of the method consists of an exhaus-
tive list of paths of length seven, and the observation that none of these paths
contains each edge, or bridge, exactly once. This proof does not tell us whether
there is a deeper reason for this fact, or if it is merely an accident. Marc Lange
(2014) formulates the problem with Brute Force Methods as follows:
A brute force approach is not selective. It sets aside no features
of the problem as irrelevant. [...] In contrast, an explanation must
be selective. It must pick out a particular feature of the setup and
deem it responsible for (and other features irrelevant to) the result
being explained. (Ibid., p. 499)
I agree with Lange’s verdict that providing relevant information is at the
very core of providing a good explanation. Finally, turning to the Intermediate
Method, it is not as explanatory as Euler’s Theorem, but it has some explanatory
power, because it is an intermediate step towards Euler’s Theorem.
I will argue that the explanatory power of the three methods is not categor-
ical – explanatory vs. non-explanatory methods – but that explanatory power
10Brute Force Methods can be applied whenever a problem is decidable. For example, we
may want to find out whether a mathematical structure has a certain property or not, and
this can be determined by going through all (finitely many) possible cases. A Brute Force
Method then systematically goes through all possible cases, and answers “Yes” if at least one
case comes out positive, and “No” otherwise.
7
is a matter of degree. If explanatory power comes in degrees, this makes it
possible to account for a gradual improvement of explanations. We will see an
improvement from the Brute Force Method, which has virtually no explana-
tory power, over the Intermediate Method, which does a lot better, to Euler’s
Method, which is an improvement on the Intermediate Method.11
5 Explanations in Euler’s Königsberg
5.1 Relevant Information and Graph Theory
I have argued above that the three methods we find in Euler’s paper differ when
it comes to explanatory power. If this is correct, I still have to determine what
it is about the three methods that makes them more or less explanatory. I will
now analyze the differences between the methods and argue why I believe that
these differences are explanatorily relevant.
Euler himself dismisses the Brute Force Method early on, in paragraph 3 of
the paper. In this passage, he also gives reasons for dismissing the method, and
implicit standards for an acceptable method:
The particular problem of the seven bridges of Königsberg could
be solved by carefully tabulating all possible paths, thereby ascer-
taining by inspection which of them, if any, met the requirement.
This method of solution, however, is too tedious and too difficult
because of the large number of possible combinations, and in the
other problems where many more bridges are involved it could not
be used at all. When the analysis is undertaken in the manner just
described it yields a great many details that are irrelevant to the
problem; undoubtedly this is the reason the method is so onerous.
(Euler, 1956, p. 574)
These remarks can be fruitfully analyzed from an explanatory perspective;
however, they need some unpacking. What does Euler mean when he writes
that the Brute Force Method gives us irrelevant details? In one sense, this is
wrong: the method does not give us any irrelevant information, because we
need a complete list of possible paths of a certain length to establish that there
really is no Euler path in a graph. Yet, in another sense, Euler is right. Every
time we write down one possible path, we draw on the whole structure, which
dictates what sequences are potential Euler paths. In doing this, we use the
same structural information more than once, for example if two paths share an
11We could interpret the Brute Force Method as not being explanatory at all. However, this
is, strictly speaking, not true. There are proofs, so-called zero-knowledge proofs, that only
show that a result is true, without giving us any knowledge as to why this is so, in a strict,
cryptographic sense of knowledge; see Aaronson (2013, Sec. 9.1). However, these are non-
classical, probabilistic proofs, and deductive analogues will always convey some information.
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initial segment. The Brute Force Method uses the structural information of the
graph in a redundant manner.12
Compare this to the use of relevant information in the Intermediate Method
(and Euler’s Theorem, which builds on the Intermediate Method). The main
idea behind the Intermediate Method is to determine whether there is an Euler
path in a graph on the basis of the degree of vertices. More specifically, if we
want to know whether the whole system has the global property of having an
Euler path, we only have to determine whether certain parts of the system, the
vertices, have certain degrees, which is a local property. This reduces irrelevant
information, because each area is used exactly once to determine the degree,
and not each time a path passes through it, as in the Brute Force Method.
Knowledge about Euler paths is, literally, equal to the sum of knowledge about
degrees of vertices.
This brings us to the key idea of Euler’s paper: the way in which the property
of having an Euler path is calculated on the basis of the degree of vertices. If we
want to compare the sum of degrees of all vertices with the length of Euler paths
in equation (1), we have to conceptualize bridges as pairs of areas, by notating
a bridge in terms of the letters for the areas connected by said bridge. This
notational device constitutes the graph-theoretic approach to the Königsberg
problem. Establishing a connection between the global property of having an
Euler path and the sum of the local properties of degrees of vertices requires
graph theory in an essential manner. In contrast, the Brute Force Method
does not rely on the idea that we can express lower-case letters in terms of
capital letters. If you want to tabulate all possible paths of a certain length,
strings of lower-case letters will do the job. This means that the graph-theoretic
representation of the structure is not used in the Brute Force Method. When
we apply the Brute Force Method, we use the structure to generate solutions,
but we do not make use of graph-theoretical notation. In this sense, graph
theory is not necessary for the Brute Force Method, but it is necessary for the
Intermediate Method.
I propose that the Intermediate Method is more explanatory because it pro-
vides less irrelevant information than the Brute Force Method. It could be asked
why we should think that providing irrelevant information yields a less powerful
explanation. Irrelevant information makes for an inferior explanation because
if we are given an explanation, we presuppose that all the information we are
given is explanatorily relevant, which is violated by the irrelevant information.
This proposition is not particularly controversial, but it is also not particularly
telling. It is much more important to determine what information is in fact
relevant. This task is hard, if not impossible, to carry out in general; however,
it can be done in particular cases, such as the Königsberg case. The Intermedi-
ate Method answers a why-question about the non-existence of an Euler path
by examining the degrees of vertices. Thus, relevant information is informa-
tion about the degree of vertices. Importantly, Euler gets to these properties
12This does not speak against all kinds of algorithms that compile lists of paths; the redun-
dancy could be overcome, to a certain degree, by using a clever search algorithm.
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by using graph theory in an essential manner. This, in turn, means that the
explanation is essentially graph-theoretical.
5.2 Computational Complexity
Euler states a second reason for rejecting the Brute Force Method in the above
quote: The method’s intractability. The Brute Force Method yields a “large
number of possible combinations”, which makes it difficult to carry out in the
case of bigger systems, or even impossible. If we examine a naive version of the
Brute Force Method, we can see what Euler means: if we construct all possible
paths of a certain length starting from one of the V vertices, we can end up with
as many as (|V |−1)! candidate paths: the number of paths to be checked grows
faster than exponential in the number of vertices in the worst case. For large
V , it is impossible to check all possibilities in a reasonable amount of time.
I propose that what Euler has in mind here is the computational complexity
of the Brute Force Method. Computational complexity is a measure of the
computational resources that are necessary to solve a problem.13 Compare
this to the computational complexity of finding an Euler path based on Euler’s
Theorem: An Euler path can be found in O(|E|) time, i.e., the number of steps
it takes to find an Euler path is linear in the number of edges of the graph14.
Thus, the problem is tractable even for large graphs.
The difference in computational complexity is closely related to the different
ways in which the methods extract information from the graphs. The Brute
Force Method extracts the information in a redundant manner; on the other
end of the spectrum, Euler’s Theorem extracts exactly what we need. In the
above quote, Euler himself suggests that this is the case; he writes that irrelevant
details are the reason why the Brute Force Method is “onerous”. Thus, the high
computational complexity of the Brute Force Method is a consequence of taking
into account irrelevant information.
If there is a correlation between the use of irrelevant information and high
computational complexity, then we now have a useful tool for diagnosing dif-
ferences in explanatory power: We can use computational complexity, which is
an objective property of algorithms, to reason back to differences in the use of
irrelevant information, a somewhat vague notion. Concretely, if we have two
methods for solving the same problem, and one of them has high computational
complexity, while the other has low computational complexity, then the high
complexity method is bound to have low explanatory power, because it pro-
cesses irrelevant information. The decrease in computational complexity from
the Brute Force Method to Euler’s Theorem aligns with an increase in explana-
tory power.
13Note that while the Intermediate Method and Euler’s Theorm fare better than the Brute
Force Method in terms of time complexity, the Brute Force Method is simpler to state than
the other methods, i.e., the program-size complexity of the algorithms may increase, and thus
be uncorrelated with, explanatory power.
14Note that the complexity may depend on the size of both E and V; see, e.g., Gibbons
(1985, Ch. 6) for more on issues of complexity.
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Some caveats are in order when we use computational complexity to diagnose
explanatory power. First, it should be emphasized that the correlation between
computational complexity and explanatory power does not imply that the two
notions are conceptually the same. Low computational complexity is not to
be identified with high explanatory power. I am merely proposing that low
computational complexity is a consequence of high explanatory power. The two
notions are correlated, but they should not be identified.
Second, computational complexity is a notion that applies to algorithms
only; it should not be attributed to the application of an algorithm to a par-
ticular case. If a certain method X has lower computational complexity than
method Y , the application of X to a particular case a will not always be more
efficient than the application Y to the same case a. The notion of computational
complexity is usually a statement about how difficult it is to solve problems in
the worst case. In instances where the worst case scenario is overly pessimistic,
it may be easier to solve a problem based on a method that is of high complex-
ity. Take, for example, a system with a circular graph. If we apply the Brute
Force Method to this graph, a list of the possible paths will comprise one item,
which is an Euler path, while on Euler’s Theorem, we have to check the degree
of each vertex.
Finally, we should not use computational complexity to compare explanatory
power across different problems. Some problems may have higher complexity
because they are just inherently harder, and we do not want to infer that meth-
ods for hard problems have low explanatory power simpliciter. Compare the
problem of finding Euler paths with the problem of finding Hamiltonian cycles:
The latter problem is known to be NP-complete, i.e., it is inherently compu-
tationally hard. However, we do not want to conclude from this that Euler’s
Method, which only requires linear time, therefore has more explanatory power
than any solution to the Hamiltonian cycle problem.
5.3 Logical Strength and Depth
Let us now compare the Intermediate Method and Euler’s Theorem with re-
spect to explanatory power. Euler’s Theorem is deduced from the Intermediate
Method: Euler’s Theorem follows from the Intermediate Method, represented
in equation (1), via equation (2). Euler’s Theorem thereby inherits the use of
local information and graph-theoretic methods from the Intermediate Method.
Thus, the two methods are closely related.
However, there are also relevant differences between the Intermediate Method
and Euler’s Theorem. First, if we want to apply the Intermediate Method, we
have to determine the degree of each area, and carry out the computation on the
LHS of (1). The equality can then be violated in different ways: the LHS can
exceed the RHS by two, four, six, and so on. Thus, the Intermediate Method
still provides too much information, if we only want to know if an Euler path
does or does not exist in a particular graph. Euler’s Theorem is weaker in that it
does not distinguish between these cases; all that matters is whether the degree
of the areas is even or odd. Euler’s Theorem is maximally informative: it is
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necessary and sufficient to know whether the degree of certain areas is even or
odd to solve the problem.
The difference between the Intermediate Method and Euler’s Theorem we
have just identified is a difference in logical strength. Euler’s Theorem uses a
condition that is logically weaker than the Intermediate Method – it is mini-
mal and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Euler
paths. Thus, we can increase explanatory power if we can weaken the conditions
from which we derive a result. It is plausible that those parts of a condition
that are not necessary for the derivation of a result provide irrelevant infor-
mation. The idea that explanatory power is related to the specification of a
sufficient and necessary condition, as opposed to a merely sufficient one, has
recently been proposed by Christopher Pincock (2015). Pincock’s conception
of “abstract explanation” requires an equivalence. The difference between the
Intermediate Method and Euler’s Theorem supports the claim that this is in
fact explanatorily relevant. Note that the Brute Force Method does not specify
any general property that is shared by all, or only, those graphs in which there
is an Euler path.
There is a second difference between Euler’s Theorem and the Intermediate
Method that is indicative of their different explanatory power. Euler’s Theorem
can not only be deduced from the Intermediate Method, it also provides an
explanation of one aspect of the Intermediate Method. Why does the sum on
the LHS of equation (1) exceed n + 1 in some cases? Euler’s Theorem shows
that this is so because in these cases, there are more than two areas with odd
degree, as we can infer from equation (2). This might indicate that Euler’s
Theorem has more explanatory power. The idea that the explanatory power of
proofs is responsible for the “depth” of theorems has recently been proposed by
Marc Lange (2015). One way in which a proof can be deeper than another is
if it answers more why-questions than a more shallow theorem. In the present
case, we would say that Euler’s Theorem is “deeper” because it explains a fact
that the more “shallow” Intermediate Method leaves open. Note that this is an
explanatory relation between methods, not to be confused with the explanatory
relation between methods and graphs.
In sum, I have identified various differences between the three methods,
and I have argued that these differences are responsible for the difference in
explanatory power between the methods. How do these differences fit together,
and what is the general picture of explanatory power that emerges from this
analysis? These are the questions to which I now turn.
6 The Proposal
The most important difference between the three methods is the degree to which
they provide relevant information in their answer as to why there is an Euler
path in some graphs and not in others. I propose that providing relevant in-
formation is directly related to explanatory power in the following manner:
Explanation X has greater explanatory power than explanation Y if the answer
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provided by X is more relevant, or less redundant, than the answer provided by
Y .
The idea that good explanations provide relevant, or salient, information, is
not new. It fits nicely with a recent account of mathematical explanations by
Marc Lange (2014). Lange focuses on the question whether proofs of a theorem
are explanatory or not. Lange finds that the difference between a proof that
explains as opposed to a non-explanatory proof has to do with “differences in
the way they extract the theorem from the axioms” (Ibid., p. 487, emphasis
in original). In particular, an explanation “must pick out a particular feature
of the setup and deem it responsible for (and other features irrelevant to) the
result being explained” (Ibid., p. 499). In a nutshell, the difference between
explanatory and non-explanatory proof has to do with the particular path be-
tween premises and result. This also applies to the Königsberg case: All three
methods take a structure, or certain kinds of structures as a starting point,
and arrive at the same conclusion, viz. the existence or non-existence of Euler
paths. But they arrive at this conclusion in very different ways. My analysis
thus aligns nicely with Lange’s account.
The idea that an explanation is better if it provides more relevant informa-
tion is intuitively appealing, but it prompts further questions. Can we give a
general account of what it means to provide relevant information? And: Can we
specify a general measure of relevant information? It will be hard to give a sat-
isfactory answer to the first question. To see why, it is helpful to return to Brute
Force Methods for a moment. Brute Force Methods do generally provide lots of
irrelevant information, as I argued in section 4. However, Brute Force Methods
also have an advantage: They can be applied to many problems without deep
knowledge of the mathematical structure in question. All that is necessary is
knowledge of how to exhaust the (finite) search space of possible answers. If
we turn this on its head, we see that a good explanation depends on a deep
understanding of the mathematical structures in question. The tradeoff that we
observe in Brute Force Methods suggests that providing relevant information
depends on the specifics of a particular problem – which, in turn, makes it hard
to say what relevant information is in general.
However, following Lange (2014), we can still systematize different kinds of
problems at various levels of specificity. Lange discusses cases where the symme-
try of a particular problem is the feature to be explained, and so the explanation
should exploit that symmetry. In other cases, such as the Königsberg problem,
other aspects are relevant. I argued that in the Königsberg case, it was impor-
tant that Euler conceptualized the problem as graph-theoretical. This concep-
tualization made it possible to explain a global property of the graph in terms
of local properties of vertices. This strategy to extract relevant information is
not specific to the Königsberg case, but applies more widely to graph-theoretic
problems, many of which follow the same pattern as the Königsberg case. Tim-
othy Gowers (2008, p. 215) writes: “Many questions in graph theory take the
form of asking what some structural property of a graph can tell you about its
other properties.” The idea to explain some global property of a structure in
terms of properties of local constituents of that same structure generalizes even
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further; it is at the core not only of many algebraic structures, such as groups,
but also of, say, differential geometry. Thus, there is no all-encompassing answer
to the question of what information is relevant, but there are certain strategies
that apply to a certain range of problems and kinds of mathematical structures.
Turning to the question of how to measure relevant information, I have iden-
tified some features of the three methods that may serve this purpose. First,
there is computational complexity. The idea is that a method which is based
on a deeper understanding of a structure will extract information in an eco-
nomic manner, which, in turn, yields a low computational complexity. Second,
I proposed that the logical strength of the properties used in a method indicate
explanatory power: Weaker conditions that still yield the same result are to be
preferred, because they get to the heart of a problem. This echoes a proposal
by Pincock (2015). Third, I concurred with Lange (2015) that the depth of a
theorem, or method, aligns with explanatory power, in that a deeper theorem or
method explains mathematical facts that a more shallow theorem leaves open.15
7 The Proposal in Perspective
In order to further clarify what the present proposal amounts to, it may be help-
ful to contrast it with another recent account of the Königsberg case. Christo-
pher Pincock (2007) proposes interpreting Euler’s Theorem as an instance of
“abstract explanations”. These are explanations that pick out certain relations
of a physical system, while other aspects of the system are ignored. Euler’s
solution to the Königsberg Problem relies on the abstract structure depicted in
figure 2.
Figure 2: Königsberg Graph
This is the graph that captures all the structural features of the city of
15Note that there may be other fruitful ways of measuring relevant information. To give an
example, Mark Colyvan (2012, pp. 83) briefly discusses the idea of using so-called relevant
logic to distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. I think that this idea
is compatible with what I have proposed here.
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Königsberg that are necessary to solve the problem. Abstract explanations
can rely on mathematics, by using a structure-preserving mapping between the
physical system and a mathematical domain, but this mapping does not depend
on an arbitrary choice of units, or a coordinate system – it captures an intrinsic
feature of the system. In his 2015 paper, Pincock characterizes abstract ex-
planations as falling under the “ontic conception” of explanations, following the
classic distinction between ontic, epistemic and modal conceptions, drawn by
Wesley Salmon (1984). Abstract explanations are ontic because an objective,
abstract explanatory relation between the explanandum and the abstract struc-
ture obtains. Applied to Euler’s explanation, this means that the existence or
non-existence of Euler paths in graphs depends objectively and abstractly on
the corresponding graph.
I agree with Pincock’s point that the abstraction from the city of Königsberg
to the Königsberg graph is an important step towards a successful solution to the
Königsberg problem. Characterizing the problem based on the abstract graph is
certainly part of the explanation. However, Pincock’s account misses a different
aspect of the explanatory power of Euler’s Theorem. Pincock focuses on the
relation between the world – the city of Königsberg – and the mathematical
structure – the Königsberg graph – which captures what is relevant about the
world. My proposal, on the other hand, focuses on the different ways in which
we extract information from the graph on the level of pure mathematics. In
particular, I argued that one of the core innovations of Euler’s paper is the
notational trick of writing edges in terms of pairs of vertices, which makes it
possible to determine the property of having an Euler path in terms of degrees of
vertices. However, whether or not this trick is used is independent of the graph
being an abstract structure. Rather, the trick has to do with using a particular
representation of the graph in order to extract exactly the information we need.
To make this point clearer, both the Brute Force Method and Euler’s Theorem
are based on the abstract graph structure, but only Euler’s Theorem uses the
graph-theoretic nature of the structure, viz. writing edges as pairs of vertices.
What Pincock’s account misses is that the way in which the abstract structure
is represented is a key part of Euler’s explanation.
Returning to the distinction between ontic and epistemic conceptions of ex-
planation, how should the present proposal be classified? According to the
present proposal, Euler’s work has both ontic and epistemic aspects. On the
one hand, the fact that we can determine the existence of Euler paths in terms
of degrees of vertices is an objective, abstract fact about graphs. This aspect
of the explanation is captured by Pincock’s account. On the other hand, in
order to get to this fact, it is indispensable to use the graph-theoretic represen-
tation of the structure. The epistemic notions of representation and notation
are not adequately captured if we focus on the ontic aspects of the explanation.
Thus, Pincock’s proposal, or the ontic conception of explanations, is not wrong.
Rather, mathematics makes both ontic and epistemic contributions to one and
the same explanation.16
16I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this perspective of the relation between ontic
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyzed Euler’s solution to the Königsberg bridges problem in
order to better understand why his solution provides a good explanation of the
fact that there is no Euler path in Königsberg. I proposed that the main contri-
bution factor to explanatory power is that an explanation with high explanatory
power provides us with more relevant information than an explanation with low
explanatory power. Euler invented graph theory to achieve the goal of determin-
ing those properties that are relevant for the question at hand. Based on a close
reading of Euler’s paper, I also proposed that computational complexity, logical
strength, and the depth of a result, can be indicative of explanatory power.
How should we proceed from here? The present proposal can be extended
and tested in various ways. The analysis of explanatory power should, first,
be transferred to other problems in graph theory to see whether there is a
“local mode” of explanation in this area of mathematics. Then, the measures of
explanatory power that I proposed can also be tested. In particular, the idea
that computational complexity goes down as explanatory power goes up should
be applied to other cases. If the present outline of a proposal is right, then the
right approach to explanatory power will require a “disciplined pluralism”: We
will have to dive into the details of mathematics to describe the many modes of
explanations that are currently employed in mathematical practice.
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